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The State of the Modern Presidency:
Can It Meet Our Expectations?
Stuart E. Eizenstat*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ronald Reagan understood that a successful Presi-
dency depends on understanding some basic truths:
a strong economy is the single most important ingre-
dient to sustaining the presidential popularity nec-
essary to govern effectively; a President must con-
centrate on accomplishing a few big items rather
than dissipating his energies on many smaller issues;
time and energy spent on enhancing the image of the
President as Head of State can provide the public
support essential for him to function as the Head of
Government.
And yet, the institution which Ronald Reagan
turned over to George Bush remains the most mysti-
fying in the country. The Presidency is at one and
the same time the most powerful political position in
the world and one of great fragility. It equally com-
bines the ceremonial functions of a monarch with the
nominal authority as head of government-an
Americanized king and prime minister rolled into
one. It occupies a platform with unparalleled oppor-
tunity to reach the American people and the world.
But the Presidency has limited power to accomplish
what that very opportunity presents. It creates the
illusion of far greater power than it actually pos-
sesses, even to its occupants. It tempts Presidents to
try to accomplish too much in too many arenas and
leads them to dissipate their energies and resources
in too many directions with too little to show.
Since the modern Presidency was created by
Franklin Roosevelt out of the crucible of the Great
Depression and the Second World War, the Ameri-
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can people have assumed the President is responsible
for things never dreamed of by the Founding Fathers
who created the office-the stability of the economy,
the welfare of the poor, housing for the homeless, the
health of the American psyche, peace around the
world. The President has come to be the embodi-
ment of the nation, his mood the nation's. The Presi-
dent must lead or no one can. Only he can set a
national agenda and a course for the country. Pre-
cisely for this reason, the public can become frus-
trated and disappointed with the inability of
Presidents to get things done.
The Presidency was created under the U.S. Con-
stitution to share power, not to exercise it unilater-
ally. But an institution created in the eighteenth
century when far less was expected of a President
must be able to handle the complex problems of
the twenty-first century. The Presidency must be
strengthened for the United States to deal effectively
with the challenges that face this country as we look
into the next century.
II. CONSTRAINTS ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER
The powers delegated to the President by the U.S.
Constitution are pitifully few and almost all must be
shared with other institutions. As James Polk
lamented, "The President's power is negative and
not affirmative. He can enact no law." His power of
appointment is conditioned by the need for Senate
confirmation. His actions and those of his top offi-
cials can be enjoined by a single U.S. District Court
judge. He can negotiate treaties only with the shared
consent of the Senate. He is the Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces, yet his ability to deploy
the troops he commands is severely circumscribed by
the constitutional requirement that only Congress
can declare a war and appropriate funds. He cannot
pass his own budget nor effectively oversee the very
Executive Branch officers he appoints.
The President finds his decisions are often dic-
tated not by what is on his agenda, but what is
pressed upon him by others-it may be the priority
of an advocacy group which was a part of his elec-
toral coalition and whose support he must retain to
govern effectively; it may be the agenda of his own
Cabinet officers; it may be legislation initiated by the
Congress; and, most certainly, it will be in a series of
external events to which he has no choice but to
respond. Indeed, the mettle of a President is often
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tested less by what he does on the agenda he has
planned for himself than by how he responds to un-
anticipated events at home and abroad.
A. Precedent as a Limit on Presidential Power.
The power of a president is circumscribed not only
by constitutional limitations, but also by the deci-
sions made by his predecessors.
Prior commitments by previous Presidents act as
precedents which can be ignored only at a Presi-
dent's peril, in much the same way that a judge is
bound by legal precedent in deciding the case before
him. Thus, for example, there can be little doubt
that President Reagan strongly opposed the Panama
Canal Treaty. He railed against the proposed Treaty
in 1976 when he challenged President Ford in the
Republican primaries and contended during the
1980 presidential campaign that it was a giveaway
after President Carter negotiated it. Yet while he
could have attempted to renegotiate the Treaty when
he came into office, Reagan's ability to do so was
severely limited by the uproar it would have caused
in Central and Latin America, and the solemn com-
mitment it represented to the Panamanians.
Actions taken by Presidents can bind their succes-
sors even when those actions have no legal force in
law. This is because they create a set of expectations
on the part of other parties or countries which, if
dashed, would hurt the credibility of American com-
mitments across the board. Every President recog-
nizes that the Presidency itself will be diminished if
actions taken by previous holders of the office are
lightly abandoned. There can be little doubt that
President Reagan and his first Secretary of State,
Alexander Haig, had little use for anything Jimmy
Carter had done as President and wished to fashion
their own Middle East policy. Yet the President's
1982 initiative and the 1988 Shultz plan and now the
evolving Bush Administration Middle East policy
were carefully drawn to be consistent with the Camp
David Accords, even though these had no legally
binding effect on the United States. Even more dra-
matic was President Reagan's decision to comply
with the strict terms of the SALT II agreement nego-
tiated by President Carter but never ratified by the
Senate and therefore of no legal value, even though
he had personally opposed SALT II. President Car-
ter had created a precedent upon which the Soviet
Union relied and which was difficult for President
Reagan to overturn.
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President Reagan had been a sharp critic of
Jimmy Carter's handling of the Iranian hostage cri-
sis, yet he did nothing as President to upset the set-
tlement, which led to the partial unfreezing of
Iranian assets in the United States once the hostages
were released. Legally, he could have said, "We have
our hostages, we will use the Iranian assets to repay
the hostages and their families, their pain and suffer-
ing, and put the balance in the Federal Treasury."
Yet to do so would have undercut a solemn obligation
by his predecessor, even one made to an outlaw gov-
ernment, with negative ramifications on other coun-
tries relying on presidential commitments.
In the domestic arena, Presidents have greater
flexibility to change the priorities of their predeces-
sors, particularly on discretionary programs paid for
by general revenues, as shown by President Reagan's
dramatic domestic budget action in 1981. But Presi-
dents have much less flexibility to change entitle-
ment programs such as Social Security, early
Medicare, and unemployment insurance, funded by
earmarked payroll taxes. These represent virtual
contract rights to the contributors, which permit
only marginal changes by Presidents. However
much Ronald Reagan may have wished to privatize
Social Security, he was constrained not only by polit-
ical opposition, but by the expectations contributors
to Social Security had that their reliance would be
honored.
None of this is meant to suggest that a President is
totally a prisoner of the decisions of his predecessors.
Ronald Reagan ended the 1980 grain embargo
imposed by President Carter in retaliation for the
Russian invasion of Afghanistan. President Bush
has moved away from military aid to the Nicaraguan
contras, a centerpiece of Ronald Reagan's Central
American policy. And he has renegotiated, though
not abandoned, the agreement the Reagan Adminis-
tration made to co-produce the new FSX fighter
with Japan. But each comes with a price, which can
be afforded only so often.
B. Campaign Promises: Opportunity and Constraint
A Presidency really begins during the presidential
campaign. It is here that a future President begins to
impart his own world view, to make decisions to
which he will be bound if elected. Indeed, it may be
his greatest opportunity to do so. It is essential that a
presidential candidate know why he is running for
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President and what it is he wants to accomplish when
he is elected. Generally, only if he can claim a man-
date on certain issues can he make his critical first
year in office a success. A President's ability to legiti-
mately claim a policy mandate from his election by
the American people is his greatest weapon in con-
vincing the Congress to support his program. In
many ways, the major difference between Ronald
Reagan's first and second terms was that he sought a
specific mandate in the 1980 elections-for budget
cuts and tax reductions, combined with a defense
increase-but was content to seek reelection in 1984
with no specific policy mandate. He was able to
achieve much of what he campaigned for in 1980 but
had a relative paucity of accomplishments in his sec-
ond term, due in no small part to the absence of a
policy mandate in the 1984 election.
But campaign promises can also restrict and limit
a President. Indeed, the sheer length of the cam-
paign, the number of states in which one must
compete, and the constituencies which must be
assembled to win a nomination, guarantee that cam-
paign promises will act as a restraint on Presidents
once they are elected. Thus, for example, in the 1976
presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter made a pledge
to create a Department of Education, in significant
part to obtain the endorsement of the National Edu-
cation Association, which was critical to his primary
victory. While he first had to be convinced that this
was not a totally unsound idea and was moved by the
fact that education did not have a seat at the Cabinet
table, the NEA endorsement was a key consider-
ation. He asked that the issue be revisited early in his
term, but his campaign commitment was too firm to
give him latitude to change. Likewise, during the
Wisconsin primary, he felt impelled because of
intense competition from Congressman Udall to
promise Wisconsin dairy farmers 80 percent of par-
ity for milk price supports. He felt compelled,
despite misgivings, to follow through on this promise
when elected. So, too, in the 1988 elections, Vice
President Bush made specific commitments on
issues such as gun control which markedly limit his
ability to act otherwise as President in the face of a
gun onslaught in the drug war.
The difficulty with campaign promises is two-
fold. First, they often conflict with the realities of
governing. In a well publicized letter written to Gov-
ernors Born and Briscoe of Oklahoma and Texas in
October 1976, Jimmy Carter had promised to dereg-
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ulate the price of natural gas over a five-year period.
Yet, as President, because of the strong opposition of
Congressman John Dingell and the late Senator
Scoop Jackson, the energy chiefs of the House and
Senate, and the recommendation of his energy
adviser, James Schlesinger, he decided to continue
controls on natural gas. At the same time, he deregu-
lated crude oil prices, which he had promised in the
campaign to control, because this was the price of
getting the Germans and Japanese to stimulate their
economies at the 1978 Bonn Summit.
The Bush no tax increase pledge-"read my lips"
-is another example of realities conflicting with
promises. It is virtually impossible to reach the $100
billion deficit figure mandated by Gramm-Rudman
for fiscal year 1990 without tax increases. Having to
maintain a campaign promise in order to keep his
credibility will force the President and ultimately the
Congress into making overly optimistic economic
assumptions and into accounting legerdemain in
order to appear to stay within the Gramm-Rudman
figures.
The second problem is the remarkably haphazard
way in which campaign promises are made. Even a
well financed presidential campaign, particularly in
the primary phase, has very few staff resources, little
data at its disposal, and is under enormous time and
political pressures to make decisions. President Ford
used to be the butt of jokes for saying how glad he
was to be in one state when he was actually in
another. But anyone involved in the continental
chase which passes for a presidential campaign
knows precisely his dilemma. On the sixth stop of
the day, a candidate may answer a question on which
he is inadequately briefed, only to find, because of
the presence of an AP stringer, that he has made
tomorrow's campaign headline and the day after
tomorrow's presidential decision. No one would
want their President to make decisions under these
circumstances, yet the decisions they make as candi-
dates are often binding on them as President. Thus,
Ronald Reagan had little hard, well thought out data
at his disposal when he pledged a three-year across-
the-board tax cut during the 1980 campaign. We are
still living with the consequences in massive deficits
which now constrain President Bush and the Con-
gress from increasing needed expenditures in a vari-
ety of areas.
There is a conundrum. Presidential candidates
are constantly forced to make promises so that their
6
campaign can claim a mandate for something spe-
cific. Yet they make them under the worst possible
circumstances.
C Financial Markets
Yet another factor that constrains presidential
action is the operation of free financial markets, both
in the United States and in our increasingly global
economy. While Presidents affect financial markets
by their actions in the economic area, the degree to
which financial markets constrain and limit a Presi-
dent's freedom of economic action is much less well
understood. Thus, between January 1977 and
November 1978, the American dollar was devalued
by 17 percent against other major currencies, in part
the product of a conscious effort to stimulate exports
and eliminate the vestiges of the 1975 recession, but
in part because financial markets lacked confidence
in the Administration's economic policies, fearing a
weakened resolve to fight inflation. To prevent a
freefall of the dollar occasioned by a loss of investor
confidence, President Carter followed Secretary of
the Treasury Blumenthal's recommendations for a
major rise in interest rates in late 1977 to stabilize
the value of the dollar, an action the President took
contrary to his own instincts as a small businessman
and as a supporter of low interest rates.
To be blunt, financial markets have an implicit
veto on a President's economic policy. In many
ways, financial markets serve as a daily barometer of
confidence in the President's economic policy
course. In 1982, President Reagan sent up a pro-
posed budget which was dead as a doornail when it
arrived in Congress. Only a year after signing the
biggest tax cut in history, he signed into law the larg-
est income tax increase in history-just under $100
billion-taking away many of the cuts he made the
previous year. The reason again was the reaction of
financial markets to the yawning deficit created by
the initial tax cuts. The threat was that an economic
recovery would be aborted by continued high inter-
est rates without a greater show of determination to
reduce the deficit. Then in 1983, this anti-tax Presi-
dent sent up a budget with contingency taxes
because of continued lingering high interest rates.
His willingness to support large increases in Social
Security taxes was necessitated by the crisis in the
Social Security trust fund and the belated recogni-
tion that budget cuts alone would not do the trick of
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closing the gap between spending and revenues in
the fund.
The new, interdependent world economy further
complicates presidential decision making. The
health of the American economy is dependent on
global financial markets. Decisions made thousands
of miles away not only by foreign governments but
by investors in foreign markets profoundly affect a
President's ability to make economic policy. Con-
sider the following:
- U.S. debt issued to finance our deficit is held sub-
stantially in foreign hands. Today, one out of every
three dollars of U.S. Federal debt is financed abroad.
In 1987, the U.S. economy owed foreign lenders
$368.2 billion. From 1980 to 1988, the U.S. went
from the world's greatest lender to its biggest debtor
-bigger than the debt-ridden economies of Mexico,
Brazil, and Argentina combined.
- The largest stock market in the world is not the
New York Stock Exchange, but the Tokyo Stock
Exchange.
- In 1986, foreign investors bought and sold over
$275 billion in U.S. domestic corporate stocks, and
U.S. bond issuers raised $43.7 billion through inter-
national bond issues.
- In 1988, for the first time, the Japanese gave
more money in foreign aid than did the United
States. With greater economic power comes greater
political power.
D. Press
The press has a great deal to do with the shape of a
President's agenda. By focusing attention on a par-
ticular issue, the press can virtually force the Presi-
dent to address it.
It is instructive to look at the difference in presi-
dential action by President Johnson toward the
North Korean capture of the American military ship
Pueblo and its sailors in 1968 and President Carter's
handling of the Iranian hostages in 1979-80. Presi-
dent Johnson was able to negotiate patiently for the
release of the hostages over the course of a year with
little public pressure, in significant part because
there were no cameras to film the incident and no
daily press attention. The same is true of the lack of
pressure on President Reagan to free the American
hostages in Lebanon. Their capture was not
recorded and the event had a faraway quality.
In contrast, daily press attention given to the Ira-
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nian hostage crisis, with its glaring films of Ameri-
can hostages carried away in blindfolds against the
backdrop of burning American flags, undercut Pres-
ident Carter's political standing, created pressures
for the Desert One hostage rescue effort and, ulti-
mately, was a major factor in his defeat. Indeed, the
"Nightline" program was initiated by the daily
emphasis on the hostage crisis, and one evening
news broadcast began by counting which day it was
of the hostage taking.
None of this suggests that the press should fail to
report such incidents. They are legitimate news and
the public has the right to be informed. It is to say
that the manner and method of reporting have a
great deal to say about resultant presidential action.
From the beginning of the Republic, Presidents
have always felt themselves besieged by the press. In
1807, Thomas Jefferson stated that "the man who
never looks into a newspaper is better informed than
he who reads them, inasmuch as he who knows noth-
ing is nearer the truth than he whose mind is filled
with falsehoods and errors." What is new is the
heightened suspicion and decline in deference for
the Presidency since the days of Watergate. Given
the aggressiveness and, indeed, hostility of today's
press to the Presidency, it is doubtful whether a Pres-
ident now would have the time within which to make
the kinds of momentous decisions President Ken-
nedy made during the Cuban missile crisis. The
press voluntarily withheld much of the detail of the
Cuban missile situation until the President felt that
the public should know. This deference permitted
him to use non-military action to resolve the crisis.
This cooperation with a President would be incon-
ceivable today, given the enormous distrust between
the press and the President.
E. The Cabinet
The President is the Chief Executive Officer of the
Executive Branch. With all the institutional checks
on his authority, the Executive Branch should be his
instrument to make and implement policy, but the
President is the Chief Executive in ways no corpo-
rate CEO would ever imagine. The President's own
Cabinet, rather than enhancing his power, more
often forces him to share power with others who may
have a different agenda from his.
Unlike a parliamentary system where a shadow
Cabinet has been in existence before the minority
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party is elected, every American presidential Cabi-
net is jerry-built. People are appointed to top Cabi-
net and sub-Cabinet positions not only because they
share the President's ideology, but oftentimes to
serve the need for ideological, racial, or geographic
balance and to reward certain constituencies. Partic-
ularly at the sub-Cabinet level, the Carter Admin-
istration had many people taken from the environ-
mental and consumerist movement who were more
"pro-regulation" than the President himself, which
led to constant tension between the President's
efforts to deregulate in various areas and his Admin-
istration's appointees who were often interested in
maintaining regulation.
Presidential Cabinets are generally filled with
people the President little knows and who have
worked with him not at all. John Kennedy named
Douglas Dillon as his Secretary of the Treasury, not
because he necessarily shared his economic philoso-
phy, but because he would be a calming signal to
Wall Street. He appointed Dean Rusk as his Secre-
tary of State, the premier position in his Administra-
tion, although he met Rusk seriously only once, days
before he announced his selection.
The President's Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officers
are subject to centrifugal forces beyond those the
President can generate. A President's control over
the people he brings to Washington to help him run
the Executive Branch is always shared by others
whom his appointees see as "multiple masters." The
Congress exercises a countervailing force over the
President's own appointees in a variety of ways,
beginning with the confirmation process itself.
When William Webster was named by President
Reagan to be the new CIA Director, there was little
question he would be confirmed. He had passed
muster once as a Federal judge and had twice been
confirmed as FBI Director, once under President
Carter and once under President Reagan. But the
confirmation process was used by the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee to send a signal to Mr. Webster
that greater cooperation was expected from him on
reporting on covert actions in a "timely" fashion
under the Foreign Intelligence Oversight Act than
his predecessor William Casey had demonstrated in
the mining of the harbors of Nicaragua and the Iran
contra affair.
In addition, it is Congress, and not the President,
who appropriates money to run the departments and
with whom the President's appointees who run the
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departments must negotiate over appropriations
bills. It is with the Appropriations subcommittees of
the Senate and House that the Cabinet officers nego-
tiate the compromises to permit their programs to be
funded. It is the rare Secretary who will urge his
President to veto his Department's appropriations
bill.
A Cabinet or sub-Cabinet officer is also heavily
influenced by the constituency groups his depart-
ment is designed to serve. Congress created each
department with a specific mission. The Commerce
Department is designed to promote the interests of
business and commerce, the Labor Department is
designed to promote the interests of the working
man and working woman, and the Department of
Agriculture the interests of farmers and rural Ameri-
cans. The mission for each Cabinet department is
fine and good, but when issues come before the Pres-
ident they inevitably involve the clash between con-
flicting Cabinet mandates and interests. Each
department has its own constituencies to serve based
on its mission and mandate. This is the essence of a
representative democracy. If different interests in
society did not have powerful Cabinet Departments
promoting their interests, they would be unrepre-
sented in the presidential decision making process.
They look to their Cabinet Secretaries to be advo-
cates for their interests.
The permanent bureaucracies which staff the
departments in the President's Executive Branch
were there when he came and will be there after he
leaves and the next President comes. Their job is to
provide expertise and historical memory and conti-
nuity. They are the institutional advocates for the
Department's interest groups. Because a President's
political appointees below the rank of Cabinet officer
stay in their positions on the average for less than two
years, they must rely heavily on the expertise of the
bureaucracy. These appointees are novices to their
jobs and to the multi-billion dollar programs they
are called on to manage with little or no prior experi-
ence. They must rely heavily on the expertise of the
career civil service and must adopt the elan and the
mission of the bureaucracy if they are to have an
effective working relationship with the people they
are to lead. It is not accidental that three of President
Reagan's most ideological bedfellows, James Watt of
Interior, Raymond Donovan at Labor, and Anne
Burford at EPA did not last. Their pursuit of policies
at variance with the interests of their bureaucracies
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ended up imperiling their ability to serve the Presi-
dent effectively. A lightning rod inevitably becomes
too supercharged to be effective to the President.
Their replacements were more acceptable precisely
because they were not such passionate advocates of
the President's program.
Over time, a President learns that the men and
women he has brought to Washington to serve him
are whiplashed between different interests. They
must balance their loyalty to him with the competing
interests of their departments and the Congress,
with whom they must stay in good grace. Regardless
of the Administration and regardless of the issue,
foreign, domestic, or defense, almost every matter
coming to the President is laden with conflict
between competing advocates within the Executive
branch, each bringing his or her own views and con-
flicting data to buttress the case. The President is
often a judge, deciding between opposing advocates
within his own branch of government.
F The Congress
The Founding Fathers distrusted concentrations
of political power and consciously sought to divide
power between the Federal and state governments
and, within the Federal government, among the
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches. They
did so out of a conviction, born of the unhappy expe-
rience with the King of England, that centralized
executive power was a danger to freedom and indi-
vidual liberty. They succeeded beyond their wildest
hopes but left a legacy in the modern era of a Presi-
dency often impotent to act and to respond to the
vast new challenges a modern-day President is
expected to handle.
It is my conviction that a stronger Presidency than
the Founding Fathers envisioned is essential for the
United States to meet the global challenges of the
twenty-first century. The President is expected to do
more than the limits of his powers permit. While this
cannot as a practical matter be done by wholesale
amendment of the Constitution, it must be done by
working out creative relationships with Congress in
which the President is given more discretion to act
within the constraints of the constitutional checks
and balances. But we have been moving in the oppo-
site direction, with the Presidency stripped of flexi-
bility by the Congress and hamstrung in meeting the
heightened expectations of the office.
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The modern Presidency truly began with
Franklin Roosevelt. The emergencies of the Depres-
sion and World War II forced the President to
assume greater responsibilities and leadership than
ever before. It was obvious that a legislative body
could not direct the country through either a war or
a Depression without strong presidential direction.
From FDR through the aborted Nixon Presidency,
the pendulum of power swung in the direction of the
President. There were times when Congress failed to
give the President a blank check during this era of
presidential ascendancy, such as Congress's defeat of
FDR's court packing plan in 1937. But particularly
in the area of foreign and defense policy, the Presi-
dent was given enormous discretion. President
Eisenhower, with impunity, was allowed to land the
Marines in Lebanon in 1958 to rearrange the politi-
cal order there. President Truman fought the
Korean War without a Declaration of War from the
Congress, and Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and
Nixon fought the Vietnam War with no congres-
sional Declaration of War.
Ironically, it was during the Presidency of the man
who centralized presidential power more than any
other-Richard Nixon-that the decline of the Pres-
idency and the reemergence of Congress began.
Three events during the Nixon Administration
dramatically shifted the balance away from the Pres-
ident and toward the Congress, where the ascendant
power remains today.
The first was the secret and unauthorized exten-
sion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia. This led to
a limitation in an appropriations bill in 1973 barring
the use of funds for bombing in Cambodia. Soon to
follow were the Clark Amendment, banning aid to
the rebels in Angola (June 30, 1976) and the passage
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
which prescribed guidelines for the gathering of
intelligence information through means such as
wiretaps.
Second was President Nixon's impoundment of
appropriated funds. These impoundments were
taken to court by the Congress and the Congress
won each one of them.
The third event was Watergate, which seemed to
underscore the dangers of an imperial Presidency
with powers too highly concentrated in the Chief
Executive. In fact, Watergate was more a case study
on what happens when paranoid people with a pro-
clivity to dishonesty are put in power than it was an
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indictment of a strong Presidency. Watergate itself
demonstrated how the checks and balances in the
system work. It underscored that a President in our
system can never become too powerful.
But these three events set in motion a cycle in
which congressional power eclipsed presidential
power and left the Presidency on the defensive. Con-
sider the following:
1. Congressional staffs grew enormously from
6,440 in 1960 to 18,718 in 1989. As Joe Califano,
President Johnson's domestic adviser, told me, dur-
ing his White House tenure, Congress had to rely
upon the expertise of the Executive Branch agencies
to draft legislation and key amendments for the Con-
gress. Now the Congress, with its expanded staff,
drafts its own amendments and controls its own
agenda.
Moreover, the Congress now duplicates many of
the institutions in the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, creating, for example, in 1972, the Office of
Technology Assessment, to serve the same role for
the Congress as the President's science adviser and
the President's Office of Science and Technology
Policy, and in 1974, the Congressional Budget
Office, to serve the same purposes for Congress on
budget making and economic forecasting as the
Office of Management and Budget did for the Presi-
dent.
2. Closely related, oversight of the Executive
Branch has grown. Each agency now has its own
oversight subcommittee. There is greater and
greater congressional management of the Executive
Branch. Appropriations bills are passed with
detailed instructions on how many times ammuni-
tion has to be tested before it can be deployed, and
employment floors are set on agencies for particular
tasks, severely limiting the discretion of the Execu-
tive Branch to manage and implement policy.
In 1978, the Inspectors General bill was passed,
placing what were effectively "congressional
moles," Inspectors General, in Executive Branch
agencies. These Inspectors General were to root out
waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement in the
management of Federal programs and to report
simultaneously to the Congress and to the President
on their findings. These were not the President's
vehicles to improve the efficiency of the Executive
Branch. Rather, they were Congress's men and
women to help direct the Congress's oversight of the
Executive.
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3. Suspicious of Executive Branch action, Congress
passed more than 200 legislative vetoes from 1973 until
1983, more than it had passed in the previous 200 years
of the country's history. These restricted the ability of
the Executive Branch to draft regulations implement-
ing congressional statutes, if they were opposed by one
House or, at times, by one Committee of one House of
Congress, without giving the President the opportunity
to veto that legislative action. This overreach of legisla-
tive authority was finally put to rest by the Supreme
Court in the Chadha case, which held legislative vetoes
unconstitutional.
But even today there are legislative vetoes in other
forms. Early in the Administration, President Bush
and Secretary of State Baker agreed to an informal
legislative veto arrangement to obtain bipartisan con-
gressional support in Nicaragua. Under the informal
arrangement, not written into legislation and there-
fore constitutional, but nevertheless suspect in terms
of presidential power, President Bush agreed not to
spend any appropriated money for aid to the contras
beyond February 1990 if any one of four Committees
of Congress disapproved the aid. Thus, Congress
effectively had the power to cut off aid without any
presidential action.
4. The powers of the Commander-in-Chief were
clipped by the War Powers Act of 1973, passed over
President Nixon's veto. Under the War Powers Act,
the President is precluded from maintaining troops in
a potential combat area if Congress does not approve
the deployment within 60 days. Certainly there was
an abuse of presidential power in fighting wars such as
Vietnam without a Declaration of War. But just as
surely, the War Powers Act is an unreasonable restric-
tion on the powers of a Commander-in-Chief to
deploy forces. President Reagan's use of force against
Libya, Grenada, and the deployment of naval power
in the Persian Gulf were all done without congres-
sional approach under the Act. So too was President
Bush's use of American military force in Panama. All
were arguably contraventions of the Act. A President
ought not to have to violate a congressional statute to
take such necessary action as the head of the armed
forces.
5. Congress took away substantial presidential
powers over economic policy in several ways:
a) Richard Nixon, in one of the most extensive exer-
cises of presidential power, under the statutory autho-
rization provided to him by a Democratic Congress
which never expected him to use it, imposed wage and
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price controls in August 1971. All prices and wages
were frozen for 90 days. President Nixon, having
called Congress's bluff, won the battle but lost the war
as Congress removed the President's authority to
impose wage and price controls.
b) One of the few tools left to President Carter to deal
with raging inflation in 1980 was the authority to
impose credit control under the Credit Control Act of
1969. When these controls were imposed by the Fed-
eral Reserve, interest rates declined. When credit con-
trols were removed a few months later, interest rates
rose again. Congress eliminated this use of presiden-
tial authority in 1980, thereby depriving the President
of yet another instrument over economic policy.
c) In 1973, President Nixon temporarily embar-
goed soybeans to Japan; in 1974, President Ford tem-
porarily suspended grain sales to the East bloc; and in
January 1980, President Carter embargoed grain to
the Soviets in retaliation for the invasion of Afghani-
stan. After President Reagan lifted the grain embargo
in 1981, Congress made sure that the authority would
never be used again by terminating it.
d) In 1974, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the
Stevenson Amendment limited the President's ability
to provide most favored nation treatment, dependent
upon a nation's human rights performance and, in
the case of the Soviet Union, its emigration of Soviet
Jews. While I share the concerns for human rights
and Soviet Jewry and support Jackson-Vanik, this
nevertheless was one of a series of actions which
diminished presidential discretion and authority to
conduct foreign policy.
6. In a number of ways, Congress has insulated the
President's subordinates from his authority. Thus, the
Congress has required that the President's budget
chief, the head of OMB, be confirmed; it has set spe-
cific terms of office for the joint Chiefs of Staff; and it
has issued periodic warnings of a desire to extend the
confirmation process to the President's National
Security Adviser. Similarly, Congress has lengthened
the time of service of certain presidential appoint-
ments, such as the Director of the Tennessee Valley
Authority, and it has required certain agencies within
the Executive Branch, such as the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board and the Consumer Products
Safety Commission, to directly submit their budgets
to Capitol Hill, without going through the OMB pro-
cess through which Presidents control their budget.
7. Nothing has changed the presidential/
congressional relationship as profoundly as the Anti-
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Impoundment and Budget Control Act of 1974,
creating the congressional budget process, limiting
presidential impoundments, and establishing the
Congressional Budget Office. In Washington, infor-
mation is power. The congressional budget process
and Congressional Budget Office ended the monop-
oly Presidents had on economic and deficit forecasts
and projections of the cost of presidential initiatives.
The creation of the congressional budget commit-
tees and the entire congressional budget process has
also enormously complicated the President's ability to
develop a budget with the Congress. For seven
straight years Congress failed to finish the appropria-
tions process by the start of the fiscal year and had to
operate under Continuing Resolutions. More and
more congressional time is now eaten away at the
budget process, and the President has had great diffi-
culty gaining control over it. In a parliamentary sys-
tem, the entire government would fall if the Prime
Minister's budget were not promptly enacted by the
Parliament. In the U.S., impasse is now the apparent
mode.
III. STRENGTHENING THE PRESIDENCY
The Presidency must be strengthened for the
United States to meet the challenges confronting the
country at home and abroad. Congress is not consti-
tuted to provide leadership because of its disparate
and divided membership.
I suggest the following ways to strengthen the Presi-
dency without losing the proper relationship with the
Congress and the courts explicit in our Constitution.
First, repeal the 22nd Amendment to the Constitu-
tion which limits the Presidency to two consecutive
terms. George Washington voluntarily established the
two-term limit which was followed until FDR. There
is no logical reason to limit a President's term by law.
No one has seriously suggested doing so for Members
of Congress. Their seniority gives them their power.
To artificially limit a President's tenure is to deny the
American people a choice and to make the President
an ineffective lame duck in his last two years in office.
Even if a President were to choose not to exercise the
right to run after two terms, the mere option would
strengthen his hand.
Second, a presidential candidate's greatest oppor-
tunity to implement his agenda if he is elected will
come from a clearly articulated set of campaign issues
on which he can claim a mandate. President Reagan
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could claim such a policy mandate in 1980. So could
Lyndon Johnson in 1964. But it would be difficult to
look at the campaign of 1988 and feel that George
Bush could make a commensurate claim. A presiden-
tial campaign must stand for something other than
the opponent's problems. The transition and early
months of the Presidency must be structured so that
the themes of the presidential campaign can be
translated into clearly prioritized legislative initiatives
which the President can then insist that the Congress
pass to fulfill his electoral mandate. Certainly, the first
imperative of a presidential campaign is to win. But it
is just as essential to win standing for something
clearly discernible and understandable.
Third, in the course of a four-year term, a Presi-
dent makes literally hundreds of significant decisions.
And, yet, it is my experience that it is only perhaps a
half a dozen decisions during a term on which his
Presidency will hang in the balance. The crucial thing
is for him to recognize those decisions and to concen-
trate his attention and resources on them.
There are three sets of decisions which, among the
myriad ones he will make, will make or break him. If
he can make them correctly, he can help impose his
vision on the country, despite all the constraints on his
action. If he fails, his Presidency will be imperiled,
regardless of how well he treats the hundreds of more
secondary decisions.
1. The first set of decisions involves setting the early
course of his Administration. The President must
prudently choose a very limited set of the most impor-
tant things he wishes to achieve and for which he
wishes to be remembered, devote a disproportionate
amount of his energies and resources to them, and
concentrate the attention of the public and the Con-
gress on these proposals. These can provide him with
early victories during the honeymoon period, build
up his public credibility, and raise his stature in the
Congress for the inevitable down times when things
get rough during a Presidency.
President Reagan learned a lesson from the Carter
years in which we overloaded the congressional cir-
cuits with far too many major initiatives, which dis-
pensed President Carter's energies and failed to give a
clear focus to our agenda. Mr. Reagan put on the
back burner many of his campaign promises on the
social agenda of the right wing of his party and
focused instead on budget cuts, tax cuts, and a
defense buildup. By concentrating his resources and
the public's attention on a few things, he was able to
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demonstrate success and bolster his strength for the
inevitable ebbing of presidential power that occurs
over the course of a four-year term.
2. A second set of decisions will be equally important
-how the President reacts to unanticipated external
crises. The real mettle of a President is judged by how
he reacts to unexpected events. It is here where true
presidential leadership can be demonstrated. It is pre-
cisely in these situations that the political system gives
the President the greatest latitude, since it is recog-
nized that only by unimpeded Executive action can
the external crisis be handled. President Lincoln said
it well, "Only events and a man's exertions on his own
behalf, can make a President."
No President consciously creates such a set of cir-
cumstances, but they give him an enormous oppor-
tunity to demonstrate his leadership and to rise above
the constraints of his office. John Kennedy's most shin-
ing hour as President came during the Cuban missile
crisis. And when the Russians unexpectedly launched
Sputnik and sent a clear signal to the United States that
the Soviets had a lead in aerospace engineering and
technology which could threaten U.S. national security,
President Eisenhower reversed his opposition to Fed-
eral aid to education and proposed the National
Defense Education Act, which was the first modem
Federal aid to education.
Of course, every external event does not lead to
dramatic presidential action. Indeed, sometimes "no
action" is the best decision. Thus, in September 1983
when the Soviets downed KAL Flight 007, besides
some rhetorical objection and some very mild action
such as limiting commercial flights with the Soviet
Union, President Reagan essentially chose a no action
option. This proved to be the right option since arms
talks were just starting and it was not clear that the
downing of the airline had been a command decision
from the Kremlin rather than the action by a trigger-
happy local commander.
A President must be ever alert to external events
because they do give him the opportunity for bold and
decisive action. President Bush missed a golden
opportunity to demonstrate that he really meant to be
an environmentalist President after the Valdez,
Alaska, oil spill. Instead, by delay and half measures,
he failed to use the crisis to demonstrate decisive pres-
idential leadership.
3. The third set of presidential decisions, and the
most important, revolves around the economy. I am
convinced that if a President makes the right decisions
19
on the economy, he can suffer many mistakes or lack
of success in other areas. A President's popularity is
inevitably buoyed by a rising economy and depressed
by economic troubles. Quite apart from the Iranian
hostage crisis, President Carter would probably have
lost the 1980 election because of double-digit interest
rates and inflation.
A great deal is made about President Reagan's
skills as "the great communicator," but these would
have gone for naught had the economy not turned
around for him in late 1982. During what was the
worst recession since the Great Depression of the
1930s, President Reagan's popularity plummeted well
below that of President Carter and his immediate
predecessors at a similar point in their Presidency.
While many factors contributed to his high rate of
popularity the last part of his first term and during his
second term, none came close to the lift provided by a
sustained period of six years of uninterrupted growth.
Presidents should spend a disproportionate amount
of their time on the economy. But few do. President
Carter spent perhaps two-thirds of his time on foreign
affairs, where the allure and greater opportunity for
unilateral presidential action drew him-and draws
most Presidents. But Presidents rarely win or lose
elections and rarely can buoy up their support on a
sustained basis by foreign policy successes. I remem-
ber being amazed, along with my White House col-
leagues, at how little long-term boost in standing
President Carter achieved following his dramatic suc-
cess at Camp David. It was little more than a blip
after a few weeks. The American people still vote their
pocketbooks and Presidents will forget that at their
peril.
A President can do nothing more important to
assure a sound economy than to be willing to take
tough steps to keep inflation under control, regardless
of the short-term political costs. Our biggest mistake
in economic policy and one for which we paid the ulti-
mate price-defeat at the polls-was in misjudging
the strength of inflationary forces in the economy,
focusing excessively on stimulating short-term growth
and temporizing until it was too late with inflation.
Fourth, as difficult as it will be to convince the Con-
gress to do so, it is essential to restore to the Presi-
dency many of the powers which have been lost over
the past two decades.
I believe it is worth a try to have a trade-off with the
Congress on foreign policy, such as has been sug-
gested by Senators Danforth and Boren and is implicit
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in the Nunn-Warner-Byrd amendment to the War
Powers Act. A congressional consultative mechanism
with the Chairman and ranking Members of the key
Committees and the leadership would be created so
that Presidents would have an early opportunity to
enlist congressional support for their major foreign
policy initiatives. In return for this, Congress would
do less micro-management and intervention in the
national security area.
A President is going to make his mark or lose the
opportunity to do so in his ability to work with Con-
gress. Each President must work with Congress in
ways that accord with his own personality. Lyndon
Johnson could act in one way. President Bush in
another. But every President must be willing to spend
an inordinate amount of time in formal and informal
sessions with Members of Congress so they are
invested with a stake in his Presidency. Nothing will
pay greater dividends. This was an aspect of his Presi-
dency that President Carter did not relish. Members
of Congress sensed this and it had a negative impact
on President Carter's relations with the Congress.
At the same time, while cooperation and compro-
mise are frequently the order of the day, Presidents
must know when to stand and fight and when to draw
the line in the sand. Our Administration made two
early mistakes in this regard. During the transition
between the 1976 election and the Inauguration, Pres-
ident Carter indicated his desire to nominate Ted
Sorensen as the CIA Director. When pressures built
up on the Hill to oppose the nomination, rather than
fight it out, the Sorensen nomination was dropped.
While many aspects of the Tower nomination were
mishandled and bungled, President Bush was right to
fight it out to the bitter end, rather than to withdraw
at the sight of congressional opposition. This will
stand him in good stead in future fights. It also
explains his determination to threaten a veto for any
minimum wage increase over $4.25 an hour-
although only $.30 per hour less than the congres-
sional bill. Winning an early fight with Congress
builds in a success that will make Congress more will-
ing to sacrifice on his next issue.
In economic policy, since a President, rightly or
wrongly, is going to be blamed or praised for the state
of the economy, he ought to have the maximum
opportunity to influence it. As President Hoover put
it, "In the end the President has become increasingly
the depository of all national ills, especially if things go
wrong." In this regard, I recommend the following:
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- A President should be given greater discretion
over appropriations spending by the Congress. While
it is not worth the effort to try to amend the Constitu-
tion to provide Presidents with a line item veto, and
we should not go back to the Nixon days of outright
impoundments, Presidents should have enhanced
authority for rescission. Currently, a President can
defer spending on any particular program until the
end of the fiscal year by sending up a deferral message
unless the Congress affirmatively overturns the defer-
ral. However, he can rescind spending on one or more
items in a large appropriations bill-in effect a statu-
tory line item veto-only if Congress affirmatively
supports the President's action.
I would strengthen the President's rescission
authority by allowing his rescissions to go into effect
unless a majority of the House and Senate oppose
them. This would modestly increase the President's
authority over fiscal policy. To further strengthen the
President's hand over the crucial budget process, the
President's signature should be required for a con-
gressional budget resolution to be binding.
- Congress should restore to the President the credit
control and wage and price control authority that
were stripped away over the last two decades. It is
doubtful that Presidents would or should use this
authority often. But having the club in the closet
would be useful during times of economic difficulty
and might give the President more leverage to take
more traditional actions to control inflation and high
interest rates. The same is true with respect to
embargo authority. I am not a devotee of embargoes
and believe they can often be ineffective and indeed
counterproductive. But, Presidents should be the ones
who have to make those decisions and should have this
weapon in their arsenal.
- The President should have greater influence over
monetary policy. I would not put monetary policy
squarely in the Treasury and under the President's
jurisdiction, for the temptation to have an easy money
policy would be irresistible and ultimately damaging
to the economy and to the country. But the Secretary
of the Treasury should sit on the Open Market com-
mittee of the Federal Reserve Board so the Adminis-
tration's position can be more clearly articulated and
fiscal and monetary policy can be more closely coordi-
nated. Moreover, the Fed Chairman's term should be
coterminous with the President's so the President
does not have to live with a prior President's holdover
in such a central position.
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- The leadership of the House and Senate should
allow a President two or three key votes on the floor
on his priority legislation so his major initiatives can-
not be endlessly bottled up in committee. This could
be done at the beginning of a congressional session. A
President may decide not to exercise this opportunity
if he sees defeat coming, but it is an opportunity that
he nevertheless should have so he can at least be cer-
tain of getting a vote on his key priorities.
- The President's opportunity to conduct national
security policy should be as unfettered as possible.
The War Powers Act has been an abject failure. It is
unworkable and unreasonable. It should be repealed
or significantly amended. There is a promising
amendment proposed by Senators Nunn, Warner,
and Byrd, and by Congressman Hamilton, under
which Congress would have to take affirmative action
to restrict a President's deployment of forces in a com-
bat area, rather than terminate deployment by a fail-
ure to act. In this way, Congress still retains a role, but
must take affirmative action to restrict a President's
deployment of troops.
Fifth, efforts should be made to reinvigorate political
parties. They can be an important asset in helping a
President govern and in giving a President greater lev-
erage over the Members of Congress of his Party. If
congressional Members of the President's Party have a
greater stake in the success of his Presidency, they will
make the President more successful.
In an age of television and mass communication,
with party affiliation among voters declining and the
public voting for the individual more than for his or
her party, this is a very tall order. But it is worth an
effort. to strengthen political parties relative to the
interest groups which balkanize the political process.
To the extent that political parties can serve as a buffer
between interest groups and a President and Con-
gress, the President can have greater leverage over the
political system. There are a number of steps that are
worth examining in this area. I would impose severe
limits on political action committee giving to Mem-
bers of Congress, but would permit virtually unre-
stricted giving, with full disclosure, by political action
committees and individuals to national political par-
ties, which in turn could distribute the funds to Mem-
bers. This would give national parties more leverage
over Members, and since Presidents control the
national committee of their Party, this would
strengthen the hand of the President.
Sixth, I would like to see four-year terms for Mem-
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bers of the House. This would serve two purposes. It
would take some of the enormous pressure off Mem-
bers who must run every two years, and it would
require Members to run on the same cycle as the Pres-
ident, making them realize that their success and the
President's are more closely linked than they are
today.
Seventh, institutionally, the Office of the President
must be strengthened. In the end, government comes
down to people. The right people in key positions can
make a Presidency, as Jim Baker, President Reagan's
Chief of Staff, demonstrated. The wrong people can
spell disaster. It is not just a question of putting good
people in the government; it is putting them in places
where their particular skills will fit. Much of the dif-
ference between the first and second Reagan terms
was in having the right person as Chief of Staff in the
first term and the wrong person, Don Regan, in the
second. While Regan was a perfectly capable Secre-
tary of the Treasury, he did not have the political skills
required for Chief of Staff. The inexperience of Presi-
dent Carter's White House Staff was a crucial reason
for the difficult first year we had and the early impres-
sion of ineffectiveness. Had seasoned hands like Lloyd
Cutler or Anne Wexler been in the White House from
the first day, the Carter Presidency would have been
far different.
There are changes in the structure of the Executive
Office of the President that would strengthen the
Presidency. One is to reduce the number of operating
units within the Executive Office, particularly those
advocacy-oriented units, such as the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality. The White House must integrate
and coordinate policy. This job is impeded and the
President's job made more difficult .when there are
special pleaders within the Executive Office of the
President itself. These advocacy units should be
stripped out of the Executive Office of the President
and put in existing agencies.
The presidency would be strengthened by an addi-
tion of a unit similar to that found in the Prime Minis-
ter's office in Great Britain and Canada-namely, a
White House Secretariat, a small group of top level
career civil servants to provide the historical memory
and continuity so lacking in the modern Presidency.
When one walks into the West Wing of the White
House, immediately after the Inauguration, for what
has to be one of the giddiest experiences a person can
have, the White House is virtually empty. All the pic-
tures from the previous President have been taken
24
down, his files have been removed, his staff is gone.
There is almost no overlap, even in the Bush-Reagan
transition, between the foreign, domestic, and eco-
nomic staffs of the White House. No one could imag-
ine a modern corporation functioning with this kind
of discontinuity and yet that is precisely what a new
President faces when he comes into office. With the
exception of the career staff at the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget and a few holdovers in places like
the National Security Council, the entire White
House Staff and Executive Office of the President
turn over almost 100 percent between Administra-
tions. There is no one around who can tell the Presi-
dent the land mines on which his predecessor may
have already stepped.
The fact is that Presidents often make major deci-
sions in ignorance of the historical background of the
issue. Thus, with the Iran contra affair, President
Reagan and his National Security Council staff failed
to appreciate many of the lessons the Carter Adminis-
tration learned from our own mishaps with Iran-
misunderstanding the nature of its revolutionary
forces, the likelihood that secret negotiations would be
leaked, the inability of the Iranian government to
deliver on its promises, and the absence of any real
moderates with whom the United States could deal.
Similarly, when Secretary of State Vance stated that
the status quo was unacceptable after the "discovery"
of the Soviet brigade in Cuba in 1979, it resulted from
a blind spot in memory. President Kennedy had sanc-
tioned the presence of a Soviet brigade as part of the
resolution of the Cuban missile crisis, a fact only later
discovered in the State Department's records.
A President needs a strong White House staff of
trusted political aides who share his world view and
who can impart direction to Cabinet Departments
driven by the interests they serve. But there is an
equal need for political aides to be supplemented by
non-political career civil servants who will help pro-
vide a historical memory and review historical prece-
dent. Thus, a White House Secretariat should be
created in the Executive Office of the President, com-
posed of perhaps a dozen career government employ-
ees of the highest caliber. The Secretariat would be
charged with providing the President's top staff with
historical analogies drawn from their own experience
and from the agency bureaucracies to keep the Presi-
dent out of trouble.
Eighth, because there are so few inherent powers in
the Presidency, the President must make maximum
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use of the symbolic features of the office. The Presi-
dency embodies the values of the country and the
President must constantly embody those values by
word and deed. In retrospect, what was most endear-
ing about Jimmy Carter during the 1976 campaign to
the American people-the common touch of carrying
his own suit bag and suitcase, making his own bed in
the home in which he stayed-translated into per-
ceived weaknesses as President. By a wholesale group
of actions, from selling the presidential yacht Sequoia
to refusing initially to have Hail to the Chief played
when he entered a room, President Carter attempted
to demystify a Presidency the American people
wished to keep on a pedestal.
In the end, Presidents can make other institutions
bend to their will only if they are successful in holding
public opinion on their side and mobilizing it behind
their programs. This must be done not by simply
appealing to the head but also to the heart of the
American people. They must feel themselves a part of
the direction in which the President wishes to lead
them. FDR once said, "I cannot go any faster than
the people will let me," and Lincoln said, "With pub-
lic sentiment on its side, everything succeeds; with
public sentiment against it, nothing succeeds."
Americans, preoccupied with keeping their own
heads above water and with the everyday responsibili-
ties of life, cannot be expected to follow and support
the myriad decisions a President must make. The
people must be given a sense of a larger whole, of a
Presidency that is more than the sum of its parts. A
poet once said, "The fox knows many things, but the
hedgehog knows one big thing." A President must
know and articulate a few big things for the public, for
a Presidency cannot be supported in a conglomera-
tion of a great many marginal ones. He must ruth-
lessly set his priorities so that those big things are not
overwhelmed by other issues, so that he is not bled to
death by a thousand small wounds. He must con-
stantly reiterate what those big things are, and why
they are important to the country. This is the essence
of presidential leadership. It is what enables a Presi-
dent to rise above all the conflicting forces and institu-
tions which pin him down, hem him in, limit his
power.
In the end, no one leads if the President does not.
The Congress, the Cabinet, the bureaucracy, the
American people, and the world itself-foreign lead-
ers, leaders on the Hill, leaders in the corporate sector,
leaders of interest groups, and average citizens-all
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look to the President for leadership. It is his responsi-
bility to send a clear signal and to sound a certain
trumpet. President Wilson said it well: "The Presi-
dent is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as
big a man as he can."
A President can-and should-enlarge the vision
of our citizens. But it is our responsibility as citizens
to give the President the tools he needs to meet our
expectations; to give him the benefit of the doubt; to
recognize the limitations under which he must oper-
ate; to be educated and to be informed. The Ameri-
can people have a right to expect a great deal from the
President. But if we expect the impossible, if we
believe the President can solve every social ill, foreign
problem, and economic difficulty, we will inevitably
be disillusioned.
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